dear travelers south of the usa / mexico border

this interesting news reporting service has many maps etc which may be
usefull in helping you plan to stay out of trouble ..
it would seem that on july 18 ... there was exceptional violence experienced
in Torreon, Coahuila state, where 18 wedding guests were executed ...
for those who claim this is not vanagon related ... can look back to the
spring where there were numerous emails from folks who had suffered
considerable hardship in their mexican westie / vanagon adventure ...
i send along this information so those who want to plan a trip there may do
so with top notch information at their finger tips
it appears to be a subscription service ... i have no affiliation with
staffor global intelligence ... and some would go as far as to say i have no
affiliation with intelligence of any nature :P
yours

    [image: Stratfor
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   May 17, 2010 | 1224 GMT
  [image: Mexican Drug Cartels: An Update]
 Summary

Since STRATFOR�s December 2009 cartel report, the cartel landscape and
operating environment in Mexico have seen significant shifts. These have
included rifts within the Beltran Leyva Organization, a new tripartite
alliance of drug gangs known as the New Federation facing off against Los
Zetas and a further decline in the Juarez cartel. They also have included
the increased targeting of U.S. interests in Mexico. Perhaps most notably,
however, are Mexican federal legislative reforms limiting the use of the
Mexican military in the fight against drug trafficking. Taken together, the
changes mean more violence probably lies ahead.
Analysis
 PDF Version

   - Click here to download a PDF of this
report<http://web.stratfor.com/images/writers/MEXICAN_DRUG_CARTELS_UPDATE.pdf?fn=7616243278>

  Related Link

   - Mexico: The War with the Cartels in
2009<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091209_mexico_war_cartels_2009?fn=9316243278>

  Related Special Topic Page

   - Tracking Mexico�s Drug
Cartels<http://www.stratfor.com/theme/tracking_mexicos_drug_cartels?fn=2516243219>

 The security landscape in Mexico remains remarkably fluid nearly three and
a half years after President Felipe Calderon launched an offensive against
the country�s major drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in December 2006.
Since the December 2009 STRATFOR cartel update, numerous important
developments have occurred.

Not everything has changed, however: The two main struggles in Mexico are
still among the cartels themselves � for lucrative turf � and between the
cartels and the Mexican government. Government offensives have continued to
weaken and fragment several of Mexico�s largest DTOs and their splinter
groups, continuing to thoroughly disrupt the power balance throughout Mexico
as DTOs attempt to take over their rivals� key locations.
A Rift in the BLO

Perhaps the most notable development in the drug trafficking landscape has
been the Mexican marine operation that resulted in the Dec. 16, 2009, death
of BLO leader Arturo �El Jefe de Jefes� Beltran
Leyva<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091217_mexico_cartel_leaders_death_and_violence_ahead?fn=6416243286>at
a luxury high-rise condo in Cuernavaca, Morelos state. Beltran Leyva
had
split from the Sinaloa Federation after a falling-out with Sinaloa leader
Joaquin �El Chapo� Guzman Loera near the end of 2007. The BLO quickly rose
to the top tier of the Mexican drug trafficking realm, establishing its own
cocaine connections to Colombia, a highly professional intelligence
apparatus and a brutal enforcement wing led by Edgar �La Barbie� Valdez
Villareal. The BLO obtained help from Los Zetas in the spring of 2008 to
augment their resources and trafficking capabilities. After the death of
Arturo Beltran Leyva, however, things quickly began to unravel for the
organization, making it apparent that Arturo was the glue that held the BLO
together.

Shortly after his death, Arturo�s brother Carlos � who many had suspected
would take control of the BLO � was arrested in a traffic stop in Culiacan,
Sinaloa state, after he provided a false driver�s license. Weapons and
cocaine were found in his vehicle. Carlos Beltran Leyva�s
arrest<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100104_mexico_security_memo_jan_4_2010?fn=1016243272>meant
that only one Beltran Leyva remained on the loose, Hector, aka �El H.�

Hector�s role in the BLO was minimal compared to the other brothers, and
many suspected that the reins of the organization would be handed over to
the top BLO enforcer and reported close confidant of Arturo, Edgar �La
Barbie� Valdez Villarreal. Even so, a federal police intelligence report
identified Hector as the new BLO kingpin in January. The decision apparently
angered Valdez Villarreal, and because a sizable portion of the BLO was
loyal to Valdez Villarreal, a noticeable split in the BLO developed by
mid-March. This split has resulted in a dramatic increase in violence
between the two
factions<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100405_mexico_security_memo_april_5_2010?fn=7216243293>.
Around this same time Hector Beltran Leyva and his close associate Sergio
�El Grande� Villarreal Barragan renamed their faction the �Cartel Pacifico
Sur,� Spanish for �South Pacific
Cartel.�<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100419_mexico_security_memo_april_19_2010?fn=9516082633&fn=4316243229>The
two former partners� fight for control of territory once united under
Arturo Beltran Leyva has spread from the former BLO headquarters in Morelos
state to neighboring regions of Guerrero, Mexico, Puebla and Hidalgo states.

 [image: Mexican Drug Cartels: An Update]
(click here to enlarge image)

<http://web.stratfor.com/images/latinamerica/map/Drug_routes_2010_800.jpg?fn=3216243241>
The New Federation and Los Zetas

Tensions between the Gulf cartel and their former partners Los Zetas finally
escalated into open warfare in early February. Reports indicate that the
rift between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas started over the Jan. 18 murder
of Los Zetas No. 2 Miguel �Z 40� Trevino Morales� right-hand man and fellow
Zeta leader, Sergio �El Concord 3� Mendoza Pena. Allegedly, an altercation
between Mendoza and Gulf cartel No. 2 Eduardo �El Coss� Costilla Sanchez�s
men resulted in Mendoza�s murder. After learning of Mendoza�s death, Trevino
gave Costilla an ultimatum to hand over those responsible for Mendoza�s
death by Jan. 25. The deadline came and went, and Trevino ordered the
kidnapping of 16 known Gulf cartel members in the Ciudad Miguel Aleman area
as retaliation.

From that point, tit-for-tat actions have seen the Gulf-Zeta conflict expand
throughout the Tamaulipas border region, as well as the formation of a new
alliance known as the New
Federation<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100308_mexico_security_memo_march_8_2010?fn=7016243251>.
The New  restore balance and stability to Mexico�s security
environment<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100407_mexico_struggle_balance?fn=9416243292>
.
Juarez

Juarez, Chihuahua state, remains the most violent city in Mexico. The
conflict between the Juarez cartel and the Sinaloa Federation has raged for
nearly two and a half years. The struggle has taken many forms, from
cartel-backed street gangs battling each other block by block, to the
military and federal police battling for control of the city from the
cartels. Dramatic changes in the operating environment in Juarez have
emerged thus far in 2010.

In one important change that has greatly affected Juarez, security
responsibility nationwide has been transferred from the Mexican military to
the federal police. Mexican President Felipe Calderon sees the cartel wars
as falling within the jurisdiction of law enforcement, but the extent of the
corruption in the country�s federal police upon his 2006 arrival in office
forced him to rely on the military for the brunt of security operations
against the cartels until January. After extensive reforms in the federal
police, newly trained and vetted federal police agents took over all aspects
of security operations within Juarez city limits, including the city�s
emergency call center (similar to the 911 centers in the United States). The
military now operates in rural, open areas outside the city, where their
training and equipment is better suited. The effectiveness of this new
strategy remains to be seen. The Mexican government will re-evaluate aspects
of the federal police strategy in December. As it stands right now, no
significant arrests have been made and the violence in the greater Juarez
area is on pace with the levels seen in 2009.

Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department announced Feb. 24 that Washington plans
to embed intelligence agents and operatives in the Juarez Intelligence and
Operations Fusion Center. About a month later, on March 22, Mexican war
college head Gen. Benito Medina said that he believed Mexico needed
international aid in the fight against the cartels. Having U.S. personnel
operate openly in Mexico would touch on strong political and cultural
sensitivities, something that has stood in the way of increased U.S.
operational aid to Mexico. Medina�s statement shows, however, that sentiment
in Mexico could be changing. At the very least, it suggests there may be
room for maneuver around the issue.

Shortly after Medina�s comments, a U.S. intelligence report leaked April 8
that the Sinaloa Federation had taken over primary control of drug
trafficking in the Juarez area from the Juarez cartel. The information was
later confirmed by the FBI. The intelligence report cited information from
confidential informants involved in the drug trade and the noticeable shift
in the proportion of Sinaloa drugs being seized on the U.S. side of the
border. This does not mean the Juarez cartel is out of commission, but
rather that it has lost control of its core turf. The Juarez cartel�s core
geography is centered around the Juarez Valley, which stretches from Ciudad
Juarez along the Texas border down to El Porvenir. It maintains some degree
of influence throughout the rest of Chihuahua. The loss of the Juarez
cartel�s home turf leaves the organization without a place to retreat to,
and the cartel has made it very clear that it will stand and fight to the
death. Indeed, violence has spiked yet again in the region in recent weeks
since the announcement of the Sinaloa takeover, with 20 executions on April
28 alone, and an April 24 ambush attack on a federal police patrol that
killed six federal agents and a teenage bystander. The Juarez area has
already seen more than 870 drug-related murders in 2010 (there were about
2,700 deaths there in 2009).

 [image: Mexican Drug Cartels: An Update]
(click here to enlarge image)

<http://web.stratfor.com/images/northamerica/map/5-17-10_Mexican-drug-cartels-map_manufacturing_v5.jpg?fn=3816243233>

It has become clear that the Sinaloa Federation is the dominant organization
in the area, as it appears to have superior funding and manpower. This
leaves little hope that the Juarez cartel can reclaim its plaza. The only
hope the Juarez cartel has of remaining relevant on the Mexican drug
trafficking scene is to come to some sort of agreement with the Sinaloa
Federation. Despite the extreme violence witnessed in recent years between
the two organizations, such an agreement is not out of the question. Before
this recent conflict, the Juarez cartel was part of the Sinaloa Federation
for some five years. That said, an agreement does not appear likely in the
near future, meaning violence in the Juarez area will likely persist as the
Juarez cartel struggles to hold on to what little territory and market share
it still has.
Targeting U.S. Interests

A series of attacks and probes directed against U.S. diplomatic facilities
and personnel in some of the most violent regions in Mexico began after the
Feb. 24 announcement that U.S. Intelligence analysts and operatives would be
embedded in the Juarez Joint Intelligence and Operations Fusion Center.

The first incident came in the form of a bomb threat phoned in to the U.S.
Consulate in Juarez between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. March 2. The threat
reportedly resulted in the evacuation of nearly 1,000 people from the
consulate premises. Even hoax bomb threats are dangerous, as they get people
out of the protective zone of the consulate building and into the open,
where they are more vulnerable.

The second incident occurred on March 3 when several masked gunmen in two
SUVs posing as Nuevo Leon state police attempted to enter the U.S. Consulate
in Monterrey in what appears to have been a probe of U.S. Consulate
security. An actual Nuevo Leon state police agent charged with guarding the
consulate stopped the masked gunmen, who departed after a tense 15-minute
standoff. The U.S. Consulate in Monterrey was also the target of a haphazard
drive-by shooting and failed grenade attack in October
2008<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081013_mexico_security_memo_oct_13_2008?fn=6816243244>
.

The third, and most notable, incident involved the execution of three people
associated with the U.S. Consulate in
Juarez<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100315_mexico_security_memo_march_15_2010?fn=3616243223>at
the hands of members of Los Aztecas street gang, which has ties to the
Juarez cartel. The victims included a husband and wife who were both U.S.
citizens. The wife, Lesley Enriquez � who was four months pregnant � worked
at the Juarez consulate, where she approved visa applications. Her husband,
Arthur Redelfs, was a corrections officer at the El Paso County Jail across
the border in Texas. The third victim, Jorge Alberto Salcido Ceniceros, was
married to a Mexican national employee of the consulate.

The motive behind the attack has yet to be established, with conjectures
still ranging widely. Some claim Redelfs was the true target because of his
connection to the El Paso County Jail, while others maintain that Enriquez
was targeted for rejecting cartel members� incomplete visa applications.
According to still another proposed motive, a Los Aztecas member testified
to Mexican federal police that U.S. government employees were specifically
targeted to draw the United States into the cartel conflict in the hopes
that U.S. involvement would neutralize the Mexican government�s alleged
favoritism of the Sinaloa
federation<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100407_mexico_struggle_balance?fn=3116243287>.

In a fourth incident, unknown suspects hurled a fragmentation grenade over
the wall of the U.S. Consulate compound in Nuevo
Laredo<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100412_mexico_security_memo_april_12_2010?fn=2716243231>on
April 9 at approximately 11:00 p.m. local time; the suspects then
fled.
There were no injuries, and only minor damage was reported. The Nuevo Laredo
consulate and the Piedras Negras consular agency were subsequently closed
April 12-13 as investigations were launched and the security of the
facilities was assessed. No individuals were named as suspects in the
attack, but it is widely suspected that Los Zetas were responsible.

National Security Reform

On April 28, the Mexican Senate passed the National Security Act, a set of
reforms that effectively redefine the role of the Mexican military in the
cartel wars. Since Felipe Calderon became president in December 2006, the
most effective security force at his disposal has been the Mexican military.
The use of military troops against drug trafficking organizations, however,
has raised questions about the legality of deploying the armed forces
domestically<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090729_role_mexican_military_cartel_war?fn=8416243280>
.

Outlook

In the coming months, violence associated with the fluid nature of the
cartel landscape should steadily increase. With the impending Zeta
offensive, already high levels of violence could spike yet again,
particularly in the Tamaulipas region. Despite a change in strategy in
places like Juarez, Mexican security forces have yet to demonstrate the
ability to clamp down on these warring criminal groups enough to reduce
violence by any meaningful amount.

As mentioned, STRATFOR expects the Mexican military to continue to play an
integral role in the war against the cartels. Mexico�s three main political
parties will be closely watching the outcome of Calderon�s strategies in the
coming weeks and months, and will try to leverage these outcomes for
political gain in the upcoming 2012 Mexican presidential elections. With
Calderon�s legacy riding on the outcome of the Mexican government�s
offensive against the cartels, Mexico City might explore other options,
including seeking additional foreign help, especially as the resistance to
foreign involvement seems to be starting to fade.

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